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THE MINORITY DOCTRINE CONCERNING 
DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION 
Herbert A. Bernhard* 
RESTRAINTS on the legal power of alienation
1 which arise by 
acts of the parties can be classified into three categories: dis~ 
abling restraints, forfeiture restraints and promissory restraints.2 
A disabling restraint exists when the property3 involved4 is under 
a direction that it shall not be alienated. A forfeiture restraint 
exists when the property involved will be forfeited upon alienation 
of the property by the conveyee. A promissory restraint exists 
when the conveyee has promised not to alienate the property; 
it may arise out of a covenant either in the conveyance itself or 
in a separate contract. 
This classification is not a purely formal one. While it is true 
that in many cases it is unnecessary to categorize the situation 
according to this particular classification scheme, 5 nevertheless, 
it is also true that such characterization frequently makes the 
difference between one result and another.6 The reason for this 
last may be found by considering the results of an attempt to 
alien property which is under each type of restraint. For one 
thing, property under disabling restraint remains under that 
restraint until the period of the restraint is over, since any attempt 
to alien is ineffective.7 On the other hand, a forfeiture restraint 
•Member, California Bar.-Ed. 
1 The term "restraint on alienation" is ambiguous, in that it could mean restraint 
on the legal power of alienation or it could mean hindrance of alienability as a practical 
matter. As used in this article, the term will refer only to the former. However, since 
practical salability is one underlying policy basis for the doctrines discussed, the actual 
inalienability that results from a given restraint cannot be neglected. 
2 See 4 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §404 (1944). 
3 Generally no distinction is made between real and personal property. 3 SIMES AND 
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1138 (1956) [hereinafter cited SIMES AND SMITH]. 
4 The definitions sometimes used appear to imply that these restraints arise only 
when property is transferred. While this is the normal situation, a transfer of property 
is not necessary. 4 PROPERTY REsrATEIIIENT §404, comment b (1944). 
5 See 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1132. 
6 See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §26.26 (1952); 4 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §404, 
comment c (1944). 
7 However, some courts would hold the grantee who conveys in violation of a restraint 
to be "estopped" from questioning his conveyance. See Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 
(2d) 440 (1945). 
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would cease to exist once the alienation attempt has been made. 
Further, both the promissory and forfeiture restraints may be 
eliminated upon agreement of all parties concerned, whereas the 
disabling restraint cannot. Another distinction arises from the 
fact that violation of a forfeiture restraint affects title to the 
property, whereas violation of a promissory restraint gives rise 
to contract remedies only. 
Thus, situations in the three categories can vary considerably 
in effect, e.g.; a disabling restraint has a much greater actual 
restraining effect on ;he salability of the property than does a 
forfeiture type. In view of this, it is not surprising that the courts 
have made a distinction between types of restraints. Whether 
such a method of distinction is best, however, is another matter. 
A primary concern of this article is the question of whether such 
characterization by types is not better replaced by a simple "reason-
able vs. unreasonable" characterization. 
Simply stated, the minority doctrine which this article treats 
holds that restraints on alienation of property are invalid only if 
unreasonable. This is in contrast to the "majority" concept 
which takes the view that all restraints on alienation are void, 
unless they fall into recognized exception categories. Since the 
minority doctrine is best understood when viewed by contrast 
to the majority doctrine, the latter is treated first. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY DOCTRINES 
A. Characteristics of the Majority Doctrine 
Both "doctrines" which we shall discuss are easily enough 
stated in black-letter type, but, of course, the decisions do not 
necessarily have the consistency and sharp boundaries implied 
by the bald statements of the doctrines. All courts would agree 
on the invalidity of a restraint disabling alienation of a fee estate 
for all time to all persons. However, as the restraints become less 
extreme in each of the parameters, e.g., the restraint is merely of 
forfeiture type or is to last for a limited time, then more and 
more courts- shift over to upholding them by one device or 
another. Often the rationale of such cases is obscure. No stress 
will be given in this paper to the minor variations, since there 
are hundreds of cases and they have been adequately catalogued 
by the text writers. 
Within the above limitation, then, the majority doctrine of 
restraints on alienation can be stated as follows: Except for 
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certain specific categories of situations, restraints on alienation 
are void; restraints fitting within the exceptional categories are 
valid. 8 In a few instances the doctrine has been codified,9 but 
in most instances it has been judicially created and sustained. 
The recognized exceptions vary from court to court, but never-
theless there is substantial agreement on many. These include: 
1. The spendthrift trust and similar trust devices.10 
2. Restraints on the power to partition (if not to last 
for too long a time).11 
3. Restraints (particularly forfeiture) on alienation to 
a small group of persons, 12 where the group classification is 
not defined by race or other social characteristic. 
4. Forfeiture restraints on a life or lesser estate.13 
5. Promissory (and sometimes forfeiture) restraints m 
the form of a right of pre-emption.14 
6. Restraints for protection of the vendor in a land-sale 
contract.15 
7. Reasonable provisions in the articles of a business 
organization prohibiting transfer of shares.16 
8. Restraints applied to gifts to charity.17 
It should be noted that some of these exceptions-most notably 
2 and 7-incorporate what amounts to a reasonableness require-
ment. Generally, however, the majority doctrine is marked by 
the class-by-class approach rather than by a case-by-case approach. 
The law is fixed for type situations. When a case falls within or 
without such a type the law is stringently applied without regard 
to the specific circumstances in which the case arises. 
8 See Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 373 at 375 (1935). 
9 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §711: "Conditions restraining alienation, when 
repugnant to the interest created, are void." This provision receives interpretation in 5 
HAsnNcs L.J. 92 (1953); Fraser and Sammis, "The California Rules Against Restraints 
on Alienation, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities," 4 
HAsnNGS L.J. 101 at 103 (1953). 
10 See, generally, GruswoLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS, 2d ed. (1947); 51 DICK. L. R.Ev. 109 
(1947). 
11 See, generally, 132 AL.R. 666 (1941); 85 A.L.R. 1321 (1933). 
12 See, generally, 36 AL.R. (2d) 1437 (1954). 
13 See, generally, 160 A.L.R. 639 (1946). 
14 See, generally, 162 AL.R. 581 (1946). 
15 See, generally, Goddard, "Non-assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 1 (1932). 
16 See, generally, 61 AL.R. (2d) 1318 (1958). 
17 See, generally, 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1170. 
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In addition to the eight exception categories listed above, 
others have been given some recognition in a few courts. Thus, 
restraints on the alienation of separate estates of married women, 18 
restraints limited as to time, 19 restraints on the alienation of future 
interests,20 restraints prohibiting the assignment of a contract,21 re-
straints on garnishment of a legacy by the legatee's creditors 
while the property is in the hands of the deceased's executor,22 
restraints calling for the forfeiture of one piece of property if 
another piece is alienated23 have all received some support. One 
may anticipate that new exceptions will be announced as worth-
while purposes of restraints arise. 
B. Characteristics of th'e Minority Doctrine 
The "minority" doctrine, as commonly phrased, states that 
a restraint on alienation, if reasonable, is valid. The minority 
referred to is a very limited one: it consists of at most one state-
Kentucky. For a long time it was thought that Nebraska might 
also have accepted the doctrine, but this contention was set to rest, 
at least as to property held in fee simple, in the case of Andrews 
v. Hall.24 A recent decision handed down by the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit25 holds that the doctrine may be in effect 
in Arkansas, but the authority cited by the court does not seem 
to justify its position. Occasionally, other courts have used broad 
"reasonableness" language in recent years,26 but in these cases 
either a recognized exception category was involved or the state-
ments were dicta. With the possible exception of a few states 
where decisions have been so few and/or so cloudy as to leave 
unclear why certain restraints were upheld or overturned,27 
18 See, generally, Rappeport, "The Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on 
Anticipation: Its Modern Significance,'' 11 MIAMI L.Q. 85 (1956). 
19 See, generally, 42 A.L.R. (2d) 1243 (1955). 
20 See, generally, 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1159. 
21 See, generally, 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1165. 
22 See 40 MICH. L. REv. 97 (1941). 
23 See, generally, 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1167. 
24156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953), noted in 52 MICH. L. REv. 616 (1954). 
25 Roemhild v. Jones, (8th Cir. 1957) 239 F. (2d) 492. 
26 See Kershner v. Hurlbut, (Mo. 1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 619, noted in 54 MICH. L. REv. 
1006 (1956); Keeling v. Keeling, 185 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W. (2d) 601 (1947); In re Murphy's 
Estate, 191 Wash. 180, 71 P. (2d) 6 (1937), ,revd. on other grounds upon rehearing, 193 
Wash. 400, 75 P. (2d) 916 (1938), second rehearing denied, 195 Wash. 695, 81 P. (2d) 779 
(1938). 
27 E.g., Mississippi [see Russell v. Federal Land Bank, 180 Miss. 55, 176 S. 737 (1937)]; 
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it would seem that Kentucky can look to no sister state for 
support.28 
The writer used the term "at most one state-Kentucky" 
advisedly. A "rule of reason" may take several forms. One ex-
treme is a "per se" approach, in which the court decides along 
sharply-defined lines that certain conduct is or is not reasonable 
and does not look to the circumstances of the conduct. The 
opposite extreme is the flexible approach of looking at each case 
in the light of its circumstances, with each decision resulting from 
a weighing of the policies involved. A "per se" approach in re-
straint questions would really not deviate substantially from the 
majority doctrine discussed previously-the difference between 
the two would merely be one of degree. The minority doctrine, as 
the writer views it, embodies the flexible approach. That is, a 
restraint on alienation, if reasonable under the circumstances, 
is valid. A restraint is reasonable under the circumstances if the 
particular purpose behind its imposition outweighs its effect in 
terms of the actual hindering of alienability of the particular 
property involved. 
Does the Kentucky doctrine follow this flexible version? Ini-
tially one must note the marked tendency of the Kentucky court 
to imply a condition subsequent and thus to convert disabling 
restraints into forfeiture restraints, regardless of the actual form 
of the language used.29 Such an attitude is certainly not necessary 
to the reasonableness doctrine. However, as mentioned previously, 
the forfeiture restraint is generally of much less lasting significance 
in terms of hindering alienation as a practical matter than a cor-
responding disabling restraint, and therefore the effect of such an 
attitude is to make a finding of reasonableness much more likely. 
Aside from this conversion of disabling into forfeiture re-
straints, the writer believes that the doctrine as practiced in 
Kentucky comes close to the flexible version explained above. 
It does seem clear that the doctrine there does mean reasonable-
Indiana [see 42 A.L.R. (2d) 1243 at 1311 (1955); Guipe v. Miller, 94 Ind. App. 314, 180 
N.E. 760 (1932)]. 
28 However, the Restatement accepts reasonableness as a factor in certain situations. 
See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §406 et seq. (1944); 2 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §173 (1936). 
20 E.g., Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W. 1084 (1926), where forfeiture in 
favor of the testator's ·heirs was allowed even though the restraint was purely disabling 
in form. Apparently the first case to set up this practice was Kentland Coal & Coke Co. 
v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916). Thus, see Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Runyon, 
161 Ky. 64. 170 S.W. 501 (1914), where a disabling restraint was upheld as such. 
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ness under the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, in 
Hutchinson v. Loomis,8° the court said: 
"In this jurisdiction the rule is that a restraint upon the 
alienation of land held in fee is not void if the restraint is 
for a reasonable period. As to what is a reasonable period, 
no invariable test has been prescribed and each case must be 
determined upon the facts and circumstances it presents." 
Of course, one can expect stereotyped situations to arise. Once 
the court decides that a certain specific restraint is reasonable in 
the absence of any special circumstances at all, it is difficult to 
conceive of special circumstances arising in a future case that 
could make it unreasonable for that case. Similarly, one can 
expect stereotyped situations in the opposite direction-where a 
restraint goes so far that it is considered unreasonable whenever 
it appears without special favoring circumstances. Nonetheless, this 
does not mean that the restraint has become per se unreasonable. 
It is not hard to find language in the Kentucky decisions 
which might be interpreted as implying that certain restraints are 
per se unreasonable. Thus, in Gray v. Gray,31 we find: " ... we 
recognize as valid a partial restraint, or one for a reasonable 
period, but not beyond the life of the grantee or devisee.''82 
It is the writer's viewpoint, however, that any such implication 
is unintended by the court83-that is, that a restraint beyond the 
life of the grantee is void where there are no special circumstances 
to make it reasonable, and the Kentucky court would not preclude 
a party from showing that such a restraint is reasonable in the 
particular premises. Obviously, for certain types of restraints-e.g., 
a disabling restraint, on a fee, lasting forever-it may be next to 
impossible to prove reasonableness. Nevertheless, the doctrinal 
theory would seem to require that the proponent of the restraint 
be allowed the opportunity to show its reasonableness under the 
circumstances, and the writer does not read the Kentucky cases 
as precluding this possibility. 
In trying to understand why the Kentucky court ever adopted 
the reasonableness doctrine, it may be well to note that the spend-
thrift trust is apparently not recognized in Kentucky.34 Thus, 
30 244 S.W. (2d) 751 at 752 (1951). 
31 300 Ky. 265 at 270, 188 S.W. (2d) 440 (1945). 
32 Cf. Howell v. Weisemiller, (Ky. 1957) 299 S.W. (2d) 118. 
33 Cf. 3 SIMES AND SMITH §1150; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.22 (1952). 
34 40 KY. L.J. 337 at 340 (1952); 20 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 66 at 68 (1944). 
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the conveyor whose motives in restraining are to assure the con-
tinued comfort of a loved one is deprived of a method for accom-
plishing this which is generally recognized. It may well be that 
the social pressure for such a method in one form or another 
led to the early acceptance of what developed into the reason-
ableness doctrine. The case which originated the doctrine, Stewart 
v. Brady,35 involved a devise to a daughter, with alienation re-
stricted until the daughter attained thirty-five. The court therein 
applauded the wisdom of the testatrix "in securing from waste 
as safe and growing an investment as probably could be made 
for her young daughter." 
II. RATIONALE OF THE RULES AGAINST REsTRAINTs 
UPON ALIENATION 
The reasons given by the early writers36 for the rules against 
direct restraints, e.g., repugnancy of such restraint to the estate 
granted, have very little meaning today,37 even though they are 
often still mentioned by the courts.38 What then is the basis 
for the majority doctrine? 
Professor Schnebly states: "Restraints which make it impossi-
ble for the owner of property to transfer his interest have grave 
social and economic consequences."39 Let us look at the most 
frequently stated of these consequences. First, there is the fact 
that such restraints tend to take the property out of commerce.40 
The undesirable effects on society potentially resulting from this 
include: (I) the unnatural increase in the market value of prop-
erty which might result if restraints were widely employed in a 
particular locale; (2) the discouragement of improvements to the 
property, since it may be unprofitable to the owner to make such 
improvements while threatened with such restraint; (3) the ham-
pering of the most effective use of property, if a prospective 
35 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 623 at 625 (1868). 
36 Co. Lrrr. 233a; SHEPPERD, ToucHSTONE, 6th ed., 126 at 130 (1785). See also 3 
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85 (1923). 
37 See Williams, "The Doctrine of Repugnancy-I: Conditions in Gifts,'' 59 L.Q. REv. 
343 (1943). Cf. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER R.EsnwNTs 43 (1954). 
38 E.g., see In re Jeromos' Will, 9 Misc. (2d) 294, 166 N.Y.S. (2d) 959 (1957); 
Johnson v. Flanders, 92 Ga. App. 697, 89 S.E. (2d) 829 (1955); Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 
817 at 819, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953); Braun v. Klug, 335 Mich. 691 at 695, 57 N.W. (2d) 
299 (1953). In the case of disabling restraints, courts often dwell on the fact that there 
is no one to enforce the restraint. See Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874). 
39 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.3 (1952). 
40 But see Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 A. 245 (1929). 
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purchaser would be a more effective user than the present owner; 
and (4) the removal from trade of an increasing amount of the 
national capital. 
When property is removed from commerce, then coincidentally 
there tends to be a concentration of wealth. Just as the former 
has potentially undesirable social effects, so does the latter. When 
the concentration is large, too much economic power comes into 
the hands of the holder, and his affairs have substantial effect upon 
the public. As such, they are a matter of public concern. Such 
phenomena as great family dynasties or extreme inequality of 
the distribution of wealth are inconsistent with much present-
day socio-political thinking. 
A further effect is a sort of "survival of the least fit." That is, 
the one under restraint is protected by the restraint from his 
own foolishness, a result which has been the subject of some 
criticism. 
Moreover, one must consider creditors. Extension of credit 
is often based upon appearances rather than upon realities. It 
is hard to justify allowing a person the appearance of prosperity 
that the enjoyment of property enables him to obtain and yet 
denying his creditors resort to the property so enjoyed for satis-
faction of their claims. Indeed, Professor Gray considered the 
practice of allowing a man to enjoy property without being liable 
for his debts sufficiently immoral to justify the rule against re-
straints, even when there was in fact no deception of creditors.41 
We must also consider the policy against dead hand control. 
While society recognizes the desire of a property owner to control 
the distribution of his property after his death, it also recognizes 
that life is for the living and not for the dead. Thus, the wishes 
of the passing generation to fetter property must be balanced 
against the desires of the coming generation to take property with-
out restraint. 
Accordingly, we see that the rules against restraints on aliena-
tion are designed to prevent at least five social "evils": (a) obstruc-
tion of commerce and productivity; (b) concentration of wealth; 
(c) survival of the least fit; (d) abuse of creditors; and (e) dead 
hand control. Not all of these are of equally great significance 
today. Thus undue concentration of wealth is being dealt with 
41 GRAY, REsrRAlNTs ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, 2d ed., §258 ().895). 
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in other ways-notably by means of the graduated estate and 
income tax structure. And with respect to survival of the least 
fit, it is not clear that such protection of the weak-if for a limited 
time-is as much against public policy as the proponents of the 
rules against restraints suggest. In any event, (a), (d) and (e) are 
definitely important today, and they constitute the grounds 
for the present-day policy against restraints. Indeed, ( d) achieves 
increasing significance as the early American dislike of creditors 
is more and more dispelled. 
Restraints are not wholly undesirable, however. There are 
undoubtedly situations in which a restraint may secure, rather 
than deny, desirable social objectives. In recognition of this funda-
mental fact, states espousing the majority doctrine have carved 
out whole areas in which restraints are allowed-the eight ex-
ceptions listed in part I-A above being a fair sample. Let us view 
these exceptions and briefly consider the extent to which each 
counterbalances the actual restraining of alienability involved in 
each case with some conflicting, but desirable, purpose. 
(I) The spendthrift trust has, of course, been carried to an 
extreme which is hard to justify, and it has been frequently 
criticized by able writers.42 However, its original motive was 
laudatory-the desire of the conveyor to assure a continuing sup-
port of the conveyee. Further, it is important from the point of 
view of this article to note several facts43 which tend to make 
the disabling restraint on an equitable interest easier to counter-
balance than a similar restraint on a legal interest. First, the fact 
that a trust device is used is significant because the trust itself 
hinders alienability as a practical matter anyhow. Secondly, per-
sons dealing with the owner of an equitable interest are perhaps 
less likely to place reliance on such ownership than if a legal inter-
est were involved. A third reason for treating the spendthrift 
trust more favorably than the legal restraint arises from the fact 
that equity's control of the former tends to protect against some 
of its potential abuses.44 Lastly, the trustee generally has the power, 
even if not the right, to alien, so that the property may be trans-
ferred absolutely regardless of the trust. Indeed, one writer has 
42 E.g., see 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §26.100 (1952). 
48 Some of those who criticize spendthrift trusts neglect these facts and rely on 
"reason and common sense." E.g., see 3 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY 398 (1947). 
44 Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 !Lulv. 
L. R.Ev. 373 at 406 (1935). 
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concluded that the interest of a beneficiary under a spendthrift 
trust may really be alienable at his election after all.45 
(2) The underlying reason for the allowing of restraints of 
limited time duration on the power to partitio:p. is historical. 
Partition was considered to be a change in possession and not in 
ownership. However, it should be noted that such a restraint 
hinders practical alienability in only a limited way, since (a) any 
co-tenant can convey his undivided interest and (b) partition may 
be accomplished by agreement of all co-tenants. 
(3) Restraints directed against a large group of persons are 
considered objectionable.46 And, of course, restraints directed 
against a social group, large or small, now run afoul of the con-
stitutional prohibition set forth in Shelley v. Kraemer41 and its 
successor cases.48 However, restraints directed against a small 
group of persons which do not fall within the constitutional 
prohibition are sometimes upheld,49 in part because of the effect 
of some early historical writings.50 The objection to upholding 
any such restraint raised by some authors is the difficulty of 
knowing where to draw the line. On the other hand, the actual 
hindrance on alienability in the practical sense is often slight, 51 
and one can sympathize with a conveyor who may have strong 
emotions against specified persons.52 
(4) Forfeiture restraints on a life or lesser estate generally 
have been upheld53 since the case of Lockyer v. Savage.64 One basis 
for this exception is that in the case of such an estate someone 
other than the tenan~ has a large interest in the property which 
might be put in jeopardy if the tenant is indifferent or antagonis-
tic. Further, life estates are generally given for the laudable 
45 29 BOST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 99 at 106 (1949). 
46 But see the discussion of the English cases in 70 L.Q. R.Ev. 15 (1954); 21 AUSTRALIAN 
L.J. 148 (1947). 
47 334 U.S. I (1948). 
48 See, generally, McDermott, "The Effects of the Rule in the Modern Shelley's 
Case," 13 UNIV. PITI. L. R.Ev. 647 (1952): 3 AL.R. (2d) 446 (1949). For the situation in 
Canada where, of course, the Shelley case does not apply, see Smout, "An Inquiry into the 
Law on Racial and Religious Restraints on Alienation," 30 CAN. B. R.Ev. 863 (1952). 
49 Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E. (2d) 662 (1940). 
50 See Co. L11T. 223a, 223b. 
516 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.33 (1952). 
52 E.g., see the will of Herman Obenveiss in PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL Hur.WRIST 248 
(1952). 
53 Where an estate for years is involved, the Restatement would limit the exception 
to the case of a business transaction. §410. · 
542 Str. 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733). 
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purpose of providing support for the life tenant and the restraint 
niay help further this purpose. Indeed, life estates are of doubtful 
marketability in any event. 
(5) Another well-recognized exception is a promissory, and 
sometimes the forfeiture,55 restraint in the form of a right of pre-
emption. In part this recognition is due to the similarity with the 
ordinary present option to purchase, which is universally enforced 
even though it effects some hindrance of alienation. Indeed, the 
present option is often an even greater restraint than a right of 
pre-emption, since the holder of a present option may take the 
initiative in compelling transfer to him, while the maturing of 
a pre-emption right is normally beyond the power of its holder. 
Whether or not the right of pre-emption actually hinders 
alienability in the practical sense depends on the characteristics 
of the option. If the pre-emption right merely allows the holder 
thereof to meet the best outside offer or to purchase at market 
value, the effect on alienability is insignificant. However, if the 
right is such that alienation will involve a sacrifice to the property 
owner, then the restraint is much less likely to be upheld.56 Also 
of significance is the question of whether the right of pre-emption 
is specifically enforceable. Liability in damages, while an indirect 
restraint, is a less effective restraint than direct enforceability. 
Finally, it should be noted that the one obtaining the right 
often has a legitimate property interest to protect which might 
be upset if his conveyee were free to alien to anyone. For example, 
tenants in common may wish to be protected from the intrusion 
of strangers into the co-tenancy.57 
(6) Much that was said in justification of rights of pre-emption 
also applies to the case of provisions inserted in a land sale con-
tract to prevent alienation of the vendee's interest. In addition, 
there is the fact that the vendor's interest is often large. 
(7) Reasonable provisions in business organization articles 
prohibiting the transfer of shares are often upheld. One element 
is the concept that a businessman should be allowed to choose 
his associates as he wishes. This results from a recognition of such 
55 There is less justification for upholding a forfeiture restraint than there is for 
upholding promissory restraint in a right of pre-emption situation because the contractual 
right is generally held to be subject to the rule against perpetuities while the possibility 
of reverter or power of termination are not. 
56 Cf. 4 PROPERTY llEsTATEMENT §413 (1944). But see Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 
2 N.Y. (2d) 534, 161 N.Y.S. (2d) 418, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957). 
57 Cf. 54 HAR.v. L. REv. 1081 (1941). See, generally, 124 A.L.R. 222 (1940). 
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factors as the possibility that the business may involve a secret 
process or the possibility that the entry of a party with interests 
hostile to those of the remaining shareholders might shatter ex-
isting harmony.58 Another factor stems from the undesirability 
of the arbitrary disruption of commercial enterprises. Thus re-
straints designed to stop the automatic dissolution which occurred 
under the common law upon the sale by a partner of his partner-
ship interest are deemed justifiable. 
(8) Restraints in charitable gifts are another special case. Since 
present-day policy seems to be to give charities favorable treat-
ment with respect to many of the property rules, it is not sur-
prising that such an exception would be created. Also, the donor 
may have specific purposes in mind which would be thwarted 
by allowing free alienation. Often these purposes are not merely an 
attempt to exercise dead hand control and are more laudable 
than the mere desire to build a family dynasty. Lastly, property 
in the hands of a charity-particularly if a trust form is used-
is usually almost inalienable as a practical matter anyhow. 
Ill. COMPARISON OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY DOCTRINES 
The primary characteristic of the minority doctrine is its 
flexibility. Occasions continually arise where, for the particular 
situation, the policy in favor of the restraint outweighs the policy 
against it. This undoubtedly occurred less frequently in earlier 
times than it does today when new concepts of property hold 
sway and new uses of property arise so frequently. Indeed, many 
of the exceptions recognized by the majority have come into 
widespread use only recently. Mass production of chattels, develop-
ment of tremendous tracts of land, the modern corporation and 
similar phenomena give rise to situations which were not conceived 
of a century or two ago. The minority doctrine obviously is in a 
better position to weigh new situations properly than is any sys-
tem which requires the creation of a new class of exceptions to 
uphold a restraint. 
A second characteristic of the minority doctrine is that the 
court in using it is in a position to weigh the true interests in-
volved. The underlying social interests involved are not so much 
concerned with the question of legal power to restrain alienation 
58 Cf. Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 229 (1951). 
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as with the question of whether alienation is in fact hindered. The 
power and the fact may, of course, be roughly equated, but they 
are by no means equivalent, as much of our previous discussion 
shows. Accordingly, the majority doctrine can result in a restrain-
ing of alienability rather than in promoting it. 59 
Similarly, but looking to the other side of the scale, the pur-
pose behind each particular restraint which arises can be viewed. 
To illustrate: As one reason for sustaining a restraint for the pro-
tection of the vendor in a land contract, Professors Simes and 
Smith point out that the vendor's interest "may" be very large.60 
Under the majority doctrine, once a court holds such a restraint 
valid ( or invalid) all later similar restraints will be treated the 
same way, whether the vendor's interest is in fact large or not. 
The minority doctrine discards the question of "may" and can 
always look to what "is." Thus, the minority doctrine allows 
weighing of the purpose of the particular restraint against its 
actual effect on practical alienability, whereas the majority doc-
trine is not geared to do this and is patently arbitrary in its 
operation. 
In comparing the operation of the minority doctrine to that 
of the majority, one should note that in its present state the 
majority doctrine is in some ways approaching the adoption of a 
reasonableness criterion. If the recognized exceptions are ex-
amined closely, we see incorporated quite a few standards involv-
ing reasonableness or similar concepts. To this extent, consider 






". . . by the weight of authority, restraints on partition 
are held valid if they are not to last for too long a 
time."61 
" ... there are several jurisdictions in which indications 
can be found that the court will tolerate a forfeiture re-
straint for a limited time."62 
" ... in some cases the courts do apparently discriminate 
as to the degree of restraint of alienability .... "63 
". . . a provision in the articles of a partnership or 
59 See Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 A. (2d) 245 (1929). 
60 3 SIMES AND SMITH, §1164. 
61 Id. at §1141. 
62 Id. at §1149. 
63 Id. at §1151. 
1186 MICHIGAN LA.w REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
corporation restricting the membership m any reason-
able way to further this end is valid."64 
Similar statements can be found throughout the literature.65 It 
would appear to be more sound jurisprudentially to adopt a 
general standard of reasonableness than to adopt a rigorous rule 
of law, then water it down with more and more exceptions as time 
passes, all the while defining some of the exceptions in terms of 
reasonableness. Further, this area of the law is no different from 
many others-when the inevitable "hard" case arises, the rigorous 
rule is abandoned in one fashion or another, with the court often 
not bothering to create an exception.66 
Also noteworthy is the fact that it is often possible in "ma-
jority" states to avoid the rule against restraints by means of 
shrewd draftsmanship.67 Thus, because of the class-by-class treat-
ment, a change in language may make the difference between 
validity and invalidity even though there is no corresponding 
change in the social interests involved. This is less likely under the 
minority doctrine, where the court weighs the actual interests 
appearing in each case. 
On the other hand, the modem desire is to simplify the 
incidents of ownership of property and to simplify the incidents 
of transfer of such ownership. _The more restraints allowed, the 
less this goal is accomplished. To this extent, the minority doc-
trine is inferior to the majority doctrine. 
Are there other points of such inferiority? It has been claimed68 
that the minority doctrine would be a litigation breeder, and, 
in the abstract, this would appear to be true. Persons knowing that 
a restraint has a chance to be upheld are more likely to include 
restraints in conveyances than if the courts' views are otherwise. 
Further, it would appear on the surface that counsel might have 
a more difficult time determining whether a restraint in a chain 
of title would be upheld in a minority-doctrine jurisdiction than 
64 Id. at §1166. 
65 E.g., see Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 
48 HARv. L. R.Ev. 373 at 376 (1935). 
66 A classic example is Williams v. Ash, 42 U.S. 1 (1843), where the court built up a 
fiction of an executory interest. Actually the decision resulted from an out-weighing of 
the policy against restraints by the policy in favor of the voluntary emancipation of slaves. 
67 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.25 (1952). Still more forms for evasion will 
undoubtedly result from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See 15 Mo. L. REv. 77 
(1950). 
68 40 KY. L.J. 337 at 343 (1952); 54 MICH. L. REv. 1006 at 1008 (1956). 
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in another state, and therefore more suits to try title would be 
required. However, empirical evidence does not particularly seem 
to support the theory. While the writer has taken no actual count, 
a quick check of the A.L.R. annotations on the subject indicates 
that (a) while there are more cases in Kentucky than in most 
other states, there are not significantly more than in many such 
states, and (b) Nebraska, where for many years the doctrine of 
reasonable restraints was thought to be in force, is not high on the 
list. As further negating evidence, one could note that in the 
hundreds of years from the time Littleton and then Coke asserted 
the validity of a restraint on alienation to a particular class until 
the time that this doctrine was questioned in In re Rosher,69 
very few cases involving such a partial restraint appear to have 
arisen in the English Commonwealth. 
Also, often mentioned as a failing of the minority doctrine 
is the nebulousness of a reasonableness standard.70 Thus the court 
in Andrews v. Hall,11 in re-aligning Nebraska with the majority 
doctrine said: 
"The validity or extent of one's title to real estate ought 
not to rest upon considerations of reasonableness in the im-
posing of restrictions. Such a relaxation by judicial inter-
pretation can only bring confusion where certainty ought 
to exist." 
However, it is not self-evident72 that a reasonableness standard 
here will be any more unsettling than it has proved to be in other 
areas of law, where it has been successfully applied. Further, the 
large proportion of Kentucky cases which have been decided on 
grounds of stare decisis implies that, even under a reasonableness 
doctrine, judges and lawyers promptly find a starting point from 
which to work. 
69 L.R. 26 Ch. Div. 801 (1884), discussed in 92 SoL. J. 240, 254 (1948). 
70 See Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 
HARV. L. REv. 373 at 405 (1935). 
71156 Neb. 817 at 821, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953). 
72 Nor is it self-evident that there is any less certainty when a rule of law is defined in 
terms of reasonableness and then followed than when a rule of law is defined in some other 
way and then in fact disregarded. Compare the restrictive provisions involved in Janss 
Inv. Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal. 753, 239 P. 34 (1925) and in Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 
181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596 (1919) (in which the courts upheld what they characterized as 
a restraint against occupancy) with those in Foster v. Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P. (2d) 
497 (1933), noted 23 CALIF. L. REv. 361 (1935) (in which the court struck down what it 
characterized as a restraint against alienation). 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The writer's conclusions are as follows: 
[Vol. 57 
(1) The policy against the actual hindering of alienability of 
property is very solidly grounded in social institutions. 
(2) Situations can and do arise where other social considera-
tions outweigh those which led to this policy against actual 
inalienability. 
(3) The majority doctrine, which treats all restraints as void 
unless they fall within certain specific exception categories, does 
not sufficiently distinguish between the legal power of alienation 
and the fact of whether or not alienability is actually hindered. 
The majority doctrine overstresses the policy against inalienability 
and does not adequately weigh policies in conflict with it which 
may arise. The exceptions which majority courts recognize do not 
fully compensate for this. 
(4) The minority doctrine, which upholds restraints which 
are reasonable under the circumstances, could be used in such 
a fashion as adequately to weigh all the conflicting policies. The 
problems which a flexible standard raises do not outweigh the 
desirability of such a standard in determining the validity of 
restraints on alienation. 
(5) The minority doctrine 1s preferable to the majority 
doctrine. 
